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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
Christine Adair, counsel for appellant Ernest Coney, has 
moved for leave to withdraw from her representation of the 
appellant. The motion raises an issue of the application of 
our local appellate rules. 
 
Coney was convicted and sentenced as a result of a 
violation of probation. After he filed a pro se petition for 
appeal, Adair, who represented him in the district court, 
was appointed by this court pursuant to the Criminal 
Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. She appropriately 
briefed the matter on appeal, and the decision of the 
district court was affirmed by this court with a 
Memorandum Opinion on March 27, 1997. Although Coney 
had requested Adair to file a petition for rehearing, Adair 
did not file a timely petition for rehearing. Instead, she 
sought leave to withdraw on the ground that after reviewing 
this court's opinion and examining the cases relied on by 
this court, "it is my opinion that no further appeal on this 
matter is warranted." 
 
Adair explained that her trial schedule, which involved 
several homicide cases, prevented her from filing a timely 
letter with the Clerk's Office and that in addition to moving 
for leave to withdraw as counsel she sought leave to submit 
a payment voucher. Counsel's motion raises what may be 
seen as a tension in our local rules and our treatment of 
counsel's obligation once an appeal has been completed. 
We publish this opinion to set forth our interpretation of 
counsel's obligation. 
 
Generally, appointed counsel in cases other than those in 
which a brief has been filed pursuant to Anders v. 
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), will file a petition for 
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rehearing. By so proceeding, counsel may seek to avert a 
potential claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or may 
believe that the filing of a petition for rehearing en banc is 
required or expected in direct criminal appeals. The latter 
would be based on a misconception, as this court, in an 
effort to staunch the numerous and generally meritless 
petitions for rehearing, provides in Local Appellate Rule 
35.4: 
 
As noted in FRAP 35, in banc hearing or rehearing of 
appeals is not favored. Counsel have a duty to the 
Court commensurate with that owed their clients to 
read with attention and observe with restraint the 
Required Statement for Rehearing in Banc set forth in 
3rd Cir. LAR 35.1. Counsel are reminded that in every 
case the duty of counsel is fully discharged without 
filing a suggestion for rehearing in banc unless the 
case meets the rigorous requirements of FRAP 35 and 
3rd Cir. LAR 35.1. 
 
Local Appellate Rule 35.1 provides that a petition for 
rehearing must contain the following statement by counsel: 
 
I express a belief, based on a reasoned and studied 
professional judgment, that the panel decision is 
contrary to decisions of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit or the Supreme Court of 
the United States, and that consideration by the full 
court is necessary to secure and maintain uniformity of 
decisions in this court, i.e., the panel's decision is 
contrary to the decision of this court or the Supreme 
Court in [citing specifically the case or cases], OR, that 
this appeal involves a question of exceptional 
importance, i.e. [set forth in one sentence]. 
 
Although the local rules do not set forth a detailed 
procedure for an attorney to withdraw at this stage of 
representation, these general expressions of court policy 
make it clear that counsel, having appropriately briefed and 
argued an appeal, is not under an obligation to file a 
petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc. Nor is such a 
filing required under the Criminal Justice Act or the Guide 
to Judiciary Policies and Procedures which implement the 
Act. The determination whether to file rests in the sound 
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professional judgment of the attorney in light of all 
circumstances, and any motion by counsel to withdraw is 
treated on a case-by-case basis. 
 
In considering whether an attorney for an indigent 
defendant has the duty to file a petition for certiorari when 
the defendant so requests, the Supreme Court in Austin v. 
United States, 513 U.S. 5, 8 (1994), directed the Circuit 
Judicial Councils to revise their Criminal Justice Plans if 
necessary so that counsel would not be obliged to file 
petitions for certiorari that would present frivolous claims 
in violation of Supreme Court rules. It stated: 
 
[T]hough indigent defendants pursuing appeals as of 
right have a constitutional right to a brief filed on their 
behalf by an attorney, Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 
738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), that right 
does not extend to forums for discretionary review. 
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616-617, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 
2446-47, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974). 
 
Id. 
 
Unlike the mandatory jurisdiction of the courts of 
appeals in a direct criminal appeal, en banc rehearing by 
the courts of appeals is discretionary. See LAR 35.4. It 
would create a conflict with our Rules were we to require 
counsel to file a petition for rehearing if counsel believes 
the petition is without merit. In such a case, counsel 
should file a petition for leave to withdraw, with notice to 
the appellant that s/he may file a pro se petition for 
rehearing. 
 
This, of course, should not be interpreted as a basis for 
appellants in criminal cases to seek substitute counsel. A 
motion for appointment of new counsel at this stage would 
unduly tax the Criminal Justice Act funds. Generally there 
will be no basis for appointment of new counsel once the 
original counsel has withdrawn following completion of the 
appeal on the ground that further proceedings would be 
frivolous. 
 
Because counsel in this case may not have fully 
understood the appropriate procedure, we will deny the 
motion to withdraw at this time. Should counsel, following 
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review of the file, determine in her sound professional 
judgment that she cannot make the statement required in 
Local Appellate Rule 35.1, counsel may file a motion on 
behalf of appellant to recall the mandate so that appellant 
will have an opportunity to file a timely pro se petition for 
rehearing should he so desire. Counsel will then have 
fulfilled her responsibilities to her client and the court, and 
may then renew her motion for leave to withdraw, of course 
providing notice to the appellant. 
 
Our willingness to allow counsel to reconsider andfile a 
petition for rehearing in no way reflects our view that this 
is an appropriate case for filing a petition for rehearing or 
a petition for a writ of certiorari. Supreme Court Rule 42.2 
allows an award of damages or costs against counsel or her 
client if a frivolous petition for writ of certiorari is filed. 
 
Adair's motion for leave to withdraw as counsel is denied 
without prejudice. 
 
A True Copy: 
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